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et al.: Speedy Trial

SPEEDY TRIAL
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy... trial.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Beckett 1
(decided May 18, 1995)
The People of the State of New York appealed from an order
which granted defendant Edward Beckett's motion to dismiss the

indictment which charged him with misdemeanor driving while
intoxicated. 2 Defendant's motion was premised on the grounds
that his statutory3 and constitutional right4 to a speedy trial was
1. 627 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1995).
2. Id. at 98.
3. See N.Y. CIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(b) (McKinney 1992). Section
30.30(1)(b) provides in pertinent part:
A motion... [to dismiss] ... must be granted where the people are
not ready for trial within. . . ninety days of the commencement of a

criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses,
at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is a felony

Id. Cf. N.Y. CR.I. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(c) (McKinney 1992). Section
30.30(1)(c) provides in pertinent part: "[A] motion... [to dismiss]... must
be granted where the people are not ready for trial within... sixty days of the
commencement of a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or
more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor....." Id. See also
N.Y. Cmi. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1992). Section 30.30(1)(a)
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abridged when "almost 600 days [had] elapsed between the
commencement of [the] action... and the People's statement of
readiness made at his arraignment on the indictment."' 5 The
Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the order of the
trial court and reinstated the indictment, holding that the
defendant's statutory and constitutional rights were not abridged
on the grounds that the post-readiness delay of over 17 months
6
was not chargeable to the people.
provides in pertinent part: "[A] motion ...

[to dismiss] ...

must be granted

where the people are not ready for trial within. . . six months of the
commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or
more offenses, at least one of which is a felony .

. . ."

Id. See generally

People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 207, 604 N.E.2d 71, 75, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9,
13 (1992). The Cortes court stated that compliance with CPL § 30.30:
is determined by figuring the time elapsed between the filing of the first
accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness,
subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of
the statute and then adding to the result any post readiness periods of
delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an
exclusion.
Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy. . . trial." Id. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is made
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 515 (1972) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222223 (1967)). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "No state shall.., deprive any person of life liberty, or
property without due process of law." Id. See also N.Y. CruM. PROC. LAW
§ 30.20 practice commentaries (McKinney 1992) ("A speedy trial is
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution's Sixth Amendment, applied to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the XIV Amendment ... as well as by
certain aspects of due process under the New York Constitution .... "). The
New York Constitution does not contain a speedy trial provision; however,
article I, section 6, sets forth applicable guarantees of due process. Section 6
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See generally
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 665 (1992) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is triggered by arrest, indictment, or other
official accusation).
5. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
6. Id.
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On April 13, 1991, the defendant was charged with two counts
of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and was arraigned on
simplified traffic informations on April 26, 1991 in the Town
Court of Copake, Columbia County. 7 Defendant's attorney
withdrew his representation on February 27, 1992 with
defendant's trial scheduled for March 10, 1992.8 Consequently,
the trial was adjourned to April 14, 1992 in order for the
defendant to obtain new counsel. 9 On that day, the defendant was
unrepresented and as a result, Town Justice Conway declined to
proceed to trial. 10 Justice Conway resigned from the bench on or
about April 28, 1992 and the "case was reassigned to Town
Justice Meenagh who scheduled trial for June 23, 1992."11
However, although jury selection began on that day, the panel
was exhausted before a jury could be selected. 12 Although jury
selection had already begun in the Town Court of Copake, the
trial was then transferred to Town Court of Stuyvesant, Columbia
County at the request of Justice Meenagh, and jury selection was
rescheduled to start on October 27, 1992 before Town Justice
Retz. 13 The trial was adjourned from the 27th of October until
December 14, 1992, because the panel was again exhausted
before a jury was selected. 14 Justice Retz resigned before the
14th of December, resulting in reassignment of the case to Town
Justice Eckel, the successor of Justice Retz. 15 The People wrote
to the Town Court of Stuyvesant on March 10, 1993 and also on
June 2, 1993, both times repeating their readiness for trial. 16 The
trial was set to proceed on June 22, 1993 by Stuyvesant Town
Justice Hart, who received the case after it was again
transferred. 17 The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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June 16, 1993, alleging that his right to a speedy trial was
denied. 18 Justice Hart denied the defendant's motion, but the case
did not proceed because the defendant did not appear on June 22,
1993.19 In addition, on August 6, 1993 the defendant was
notified that the People would present the charges to the grand
jury. 20 Defendant was indicted on August 31, 1993 on two
misdemeanor counts of driving while intoxicated. 2 1 During his
arraignment on September 8, 1993, the People announced their
readiness for trial. 22 The indictment was subsequently dismissed
and the court found that "under [CPL] article 30 as well as under
broader
language
of
the
state
and
federal
the
23
trial."
speedy
a
have
not
did
defendant...
constitutions ...
On appeal to the appellate division, the defendant argued that
the lower court's dismissal was correct and that the
commencement of trial almost 600 days after "the People's
statement of readiness made at his arraignment on the
indictment," 24 violated his statutory 25 and constitutional 26 right
to a speedy trial. 2 7 The court first considered the defendant's
statutory claim. The court distinguished the case at bar from
People v. England,28 where the New York Court of Appeals
found that "the People's filing of a statement of readiness before
the defendant was arraigned on the indictment was insufficient to
stop the running of the speedy trial clock because the defendant
could not have been brought to trial before she was arraigned on

18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 98-99.
21. Id.at 99.
22. Id.

23. Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
30.20(1) provides in pertinent part: "After a criminal action is commenced, the
defendant is entitled to a speedy trial." Id.
24. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
25. See N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(b) (McKinney 1992).
26. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
27. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
28. 84 N.Y.2d 1, 636 N.E.2d 1387, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1994).
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the indictment." 29 The Beckett court found "that the Town

Courts were in position to try the misdemeanor charges against
defendant until August 6, 1993 when the People served notice
they would present the charges to the Grand Jury." 3 0 Thus, the
court stated that the pertinent issue was "whether any of the
31
postreadiness delay may be charged to [the People]."

The defendant argued that the postreadiness delay running from
December 15, 1991 to June 22, 1993 was chargeable to the
33
People. 32 The Beckett court looked to People v. Cortes,
pointing out that the Cortes court found that "postreadiness delay
may be chargeable to the People where the causes of the delay
directly implicate the People's ability to proceed with trial." 34 In
29. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (citing England, 84 N.Y.2d at 4-5, 636
N.E.2d at 1389, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 856). In England, the defendant was arrested
and charged with third-degree burglary on June 24, 1992 and the felony
complaint was filed on that day. England, 84 N.Y.2d at 3, 636 N.E.2d at
1388, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 855. Thus, pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(a), "[t]he
statutory period, 183 days in this case, commenced with the filing of the felony
complaint on June 24, 1992, and expired on December 24, 1992." Id. at 4,
636 N.E.2d at 1389, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 856 (citation omitted). The defendant
was scheduled to be arraigned on January 7, 1993. Id. The England court
noted that the "[d]efendant could not have been brought to trial before
arraignment, the process by which the court acquires jurisdiction over a
defendant." Id. at 4-5, 636 N.E.2d at 1389, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Thus, the
court held that under these circumstances, "the People could not have validly
declared readiness until January 7, 1993, at defendant's arraignment, entitling
defendant to dismissal of the indictment." Id. at 5, 636 N.E.2d at 1390, 613
N.Y.S.2d at 857. In England, the long delay was not attributed to the
defendant or court congestion, but to the People's laxity in securing an
indictment. Id.
30. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 80 N.Y.2d 201, 604 N.E.2d 71, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1992).
34. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (citing Cones, 80 N.Y.2d at 210, 604
N.E.2d at 77, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 15). In Cortes, the defendant was arraigned on
June 18, 1987, on a felony complaint charging him with first degree criminal
sale of a controlled substance and several other related offenses. Cortes, 80
N.Y.2d at 205, 604 N.E.2d at 74, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 12. On September 14,
1989, the defendant successfully moved to have the indictment dismissed on
the grounds that he had been denied the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 207, 604
N.E.2d at 75, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 13. Upon review, the New York Court of
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Cortes, the New York Court of Appeals held that (1) the
postreadiness delay resulting from the failure of the County Law
article 18-B Panel to promptly supply an attorney to represent

[the] defendant, was not chargeable to the People; 35 (2) the
period of delay resulting from the dismissal of the original

indictments on a ground that was subsequently proven erroneous
to the date new indictments were filed was chargeable to the
people; 36 (3) the period of delay between the filing of the felony
complaint and the defendant's arraignment on the second
indictment was chargeable to the people; 37 and (4) "the dismissal
of an indictment and the filing of a new one represents such a
substantial break in the proceeding that a new communication of
Appeals affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the indictments were
properly dismissed since the People failed to comply with the statutory
requirements. Id. at 205, 604 N.E.2d at 74, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
35. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d at 210, 604 N.E.2d at 77, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The
court noted that despite the judiciary's "intimat[e] involve[ment] in both the
design and the operation of the 18-B Panel," the People had declared
themselves ready [within the statutory three month time period], "thereby
signifying that they had done everything they could up to that point to move the
case to trial." Id. at 209-10, 604 N.E.2d at 76-77, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
The cause of the delay - - the defendant's lack of representation - - "did not

affect the People's ability to present their own case and, consequently, did not
affect their 'readiness' as that term is used in CPL 30.30 analysis." Id. at 210,
604 N.E.2d at 77, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
36. Id. at 211, 604 N.E.2d at 77, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The court reasoned
that "unlike the post readiness delays attributable to Cortes' lack of
representation, this 90 day period of delay did implicate the People's CPL
30.30 obligations, since the absence of a valid indictment during this period
was a circumstance that directly impaired their ability to proceed to trial." Id.
37. Id. at 213, 604 N.E.2d at 79, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 17. The People did not
contest the entire 84 day pre-arraignment delay. Id. at 213, 604 N.E.2d at 78,
590 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The People only disputed their accountability for the 62
day time period between the filing of the first indictment and the defendant's
arraignment on the second indictment. Id. at 213, 604 N.E.2d at 78-79, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 16-17. The court relied on the recent decision in People v.
Correa, 81 N.Y.2d 930, 575 N.E.2d 42, 569 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1991), where, as
pointed out by the Cortes court, the New York Court of Appeals stated that
"[d]elays between indictment and arraignment, like other court congestion, do
not prevent the People from being ready for trial." Id. at 213, 604 N.E.2d at
78, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (citation omitted).
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readiness is needed" by the prosecution. 38 After reviewing the
record, the Beckett court found that "the delays... were not
attributable to the People but rather to an unusual confluence of
events over which the People had no control and which had no
bearing on their ability to proceed to trial."39 The court noted
that "during the period in question, five different Town Justices

were assigned to this matter and on two separate occasions the
People demonstrated their readiness for trial by participating in
the jury selection process." 40 Thus, the court concluded that due
to the exceptional circumstances involved in the case, none of the
delays following the People's statement of readiness was
chargeable to the People. 41 Therefore, the delay did not violate

the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial.
The court then considered the defendant's constitutional right
to a speedy trial. The court relied on People v. Taranovich42
which stated that although the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed
by both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal

Constitution, "there is no specific temporal duration after which
a defendant automatically becomes entitled to release for denial

38. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d at 214, 604 N.E.2d at 79, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 17. The
court found that "[w]ithout a new declaration of readiness, the trial court and
the defense would be left to speculate about the People's state of preparedness
on the new indictment." Id. at 214-15, 604 N.E.2d at 79, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
39. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 37 N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975). In
Taranovich, the defendant was arrested and arraigned on January 13, 1972, for
attempted murder, possession of a dangerous drug in the sixth degree, resisting
arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, operating a motor vehicle while
impaired and operating a motor vehicle without a license. Id. at 443-44, 335
N.E.2d at 304, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The defendant successfully moved to have
the indictment dismissed on the grounds that the 12 month delay between his
arraignment and indictment violated his constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial. Id. at 443, 335 N.E.2d at 304-05, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The
appellate court unanimously reversed the order and the defendant appealed. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate court decision and reinstated the
indictment, holding that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not
abridged. Id.
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of a speedy trial."' 43 The Taranovich court consequently
proffered the following five factors to be considered when
determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been violated: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason
for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether
or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration;
and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has
been impaired by reason of the delay. "44 In Taranovich, the
Court of Appeals held that:
A one-year delay between the alleged occurrence of a crime and
an indictment for a class C felony, even when it results from
prosecutorial inattention, in and of itself does not entitle a
defendant to a dismissal of the indictment where there is no
lengthy pretrial incarceration and no apparent impairment of his
45
defense caused by the delay.

In applying the Taranovich factors to the case at bar, the Beckett
court stated that:
Considering that the postreadiness delay was not caused by
prosecutorial inaction and since defendant was not incarcerated,
and as there is no indication that his ability to mount a defense
has been compromised by the delay, we also conclude that

[defendant's] constitutional right to a speedy trial has not been
abridged. 46
Accordingly, the Third Department reversed the order and
47
reinstated the indictment.
While the New York and Federal Constitutions differ in that
only the Federal Constitution explicitly contains a speedy trial
provision, they both similarly protect a criminal defendant's right

43. Id. at 444-45, 335 N.E.2d at 305, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
44. Id. at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82. The

Taranovich court stated that "no one factor or combination of the [five]
factors... is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim,
but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all of the factors as
they apply to it." Id. at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 305, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
45. Id. at 447, 335 N.E.2d at 307, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
46. Beckett, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
47. Id.
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to a speedy trial. Furthermore, a defendant may invoke due
process pursuant to both constitutions. 48 Under the Federal
Constitution, the balancing tests utilized to determine whether a
defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial, are similar
to the factors discussed and applied in Taranovich.4 9 In Barker v.
Wingo,50 the United States Supreme Court proffered a balancing
test which weighed the following factors in determining whether
a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
abridged: "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." 5 1 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of the
Barker factors in determining whether a defendant had been
denied the right to a speedy trial in Doggett v. United States.52
48. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 n.2 (1992) (stating
that "a defendant may invoke due process to challenge delay both before and
after official accusation").
49. See Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d
at 81-82.
50. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the defendant and an accomplice
were arrested for murdering an elderly couple. Id. at 516. The prosecution had
a stronger case against the defendant's accomplice, Manning, and believed the
defendant would not be convicted absent Manning's testimony at defendant's
trial. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that although more than five
years had passed from time of defendant's arrest until his subsequent trial,
with more than four of those years attributable to the People's desire to utilize
Manning as a witness in Barker's trial, the defendant's right to a speedy trial
was not violated because the prejudice against the defendant was minimal, and
more importantly, the defendant "did not want a speedy trial." Id. at 533-34.
51. Id. at 530. The Wingo Court stated that none of the four factors are
dispositive or even necessary in a finding of a violation of a defendant's right
to a speedy trial. Id. at 533. As the Court stated, "they are just related factors
and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant." Id. The Court stated that the fourth factor, prejudice, should be
considered in light of the following interests the right to a speedy trial was
aimed to protect: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired." Id. at 532.
52. 505 U.S. 647 (1992). In Dogget, the defendant was indicted for
conspiring to import and distribute cocaine. Id. at 648. Subsequently, the DEA
sought to arrest the defendant at his mother's house, but was informed that he
had left for Columbia four days earlier. Id. at 648-49. The DEA learned that
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However, in Doggett, the Court stated that excessive delay

creates a presumption of prejudice. 53 Thus, pursuant to Doggett,
"affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to
every speedy trial claim." 54 In comparison, New York utilizes
the Barker test, but includes the consideration of an independent
factor, namely, "whether or not there has been an extended

period of pretrial incarceration," 55 as opposed to comprising a
part of the prejudice factor. 56 However, since no one factor is
dispositive, 57 and the Barker factors are illustrative and not

exhaustive, the two approaches are essentially identical.

the defendant was under arrest on drug charges in Panama, but was released
by the Panamanian authorities before they could secure his extradition. Id. at
649. He returned to the United States where he "lived openly under his own
name, and stayed within the law." Id. After a United States Marshall's Service
credit check on outstanding arrest warrants revealed the defendant's address,
the defendant was arrested. Id. at 650. The arrest occurred eight and one-half
years after the defendant was indicted. Id. During that time, the defendant was
unaware of the charges against him. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment, alleging that he was denied the right to a speedy trial, but the
district court denied the motion on the grounds that the defendant did not make
an affirmative showing that the delay prejudiced him. Id. The court of appeals
affirmed. Id. at 651. On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
order of the district court and held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial
had been violated. Id.
53. Id. at 655-56.
54. Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
55. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d at
81-82.
56. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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